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Twelve Years of the Euro –Mediterranean Partnership
This paper aims to evaluate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, embodied in the Barcelona Process in 1995.
This partnership has many dimensions, including the economic, political, security, social, cultural and even parliamentary concerns. There have been some achievements already.
But on the other hand, many weaknesses remain. The objectives expressed in the the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent agreements and declarations, are not achieved. There are still obstacles at the level of economic relations, especially regarding the development of the economies of Mediterranean countries and the establishment of a free trade zone uniting the two sides. The focus of the European side is on security and political issues, especially regarding illegal migration from the Mediterranean countries. Also there were still differences between the two sides on visions of some of the cultural and social concepts, such as the concept of human rights, There are several other structural obstacles.
These obstacles require both sides to search for ways and mechanisms to overcome them, including working to preserve the gains already achieved in the framework of this partnership over the past years, and at the same time to work to avoid what appeared to activate the negative aspects of this partnership
During his electoral campaign and before winning the presidential elections, President Sarkozy presented a new vision for cooperation between countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. This initiative is based on the idea of creating a union that embraces all Mediterranean countries. The European leaders adopted the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, project submitted by France in the summit held in Brussels March, 2008.
So, this paper aims also to provide an evaluation of Sarkozy’s project, and what this project means for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
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The International Legitimacy of the Palestinian Cause: Theory and Practice
Discussion of international legitimacy has caused a lot of confusion after its meaning became devalued in Security Council resolutions even for some of the specialists. The term ‘international legitimacy resolutions’ has become common in Arabic literature and writings of as well as in the resolutions of international Arab organizations and bodies. With regard to the Palestinian Cause, the issue has become more complicated and more uncertain especially after the dispute between Al Fatah and Hamas about international legitimacy and its conditions. After Abu Mazen insisted on Hamas’ commitment to it, the dialogue could begin. Also Israel imposed the same condition in order to lift the siege of Gaza.
The change in the concept and content of international legitimacy after the Oslo Agreement has complicated the issue. Finally, the construction of theoretical elements of international legitimacy with regard to the Palestinian Cause and all that is related to Israel and the Arab cases differs from the implementation of this legitimacy.
This study aims to clarify these points about the theory of international legitimacy in the Palestinian Cause, and how it differs in practice.
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This paper aims to analyze the most important internal and external factors which activated Japan’s role in the Middle East during the period of the Cold War, and then explores its effect on Japan’s foreign policy for the region, and especially its position on the Palestinian Cause and the Arab–Israeli Conflict. While Japan did not want to play a role in the Arab region during the period of the Cold War, many factors and new events emerged and changed Japan’s traditional attitude towards the region and increased Japan’s political and diplomatic involvement. The most important factor, on the interactive level, is the energy issue. The fading fears of the effects of the political developments in the region cases on Japan’s economic and oil interests resulting from the peace process between the Arabs and Israel. On the Japanese national level, the major changes were the end of one party control and the easing of restrictions on Japanese army movements and the trend toward constitutional amendment. On the internationallevel, the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the bipolar dynamic, competition with China to lead the region, and finally allyiance with the United States. As a major conclusion it could be observed that the oil factor, growing business interests, and the American factor have been and remain the most important factors that influence Japanese behavior in the Middle East. They are also the most effective ones regarding its position on the Palestinian Cause. However, American influence is considered to be the most influential factor which limits the Japanese political role in the Middle East and reduces its ability to take a firm positions with Israel regarding the Palestinian Cause. |
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The price of goods and services in Jordan has recently increased and has had significant economic and social effect. The inflation rate has increased without a corresponding increase in wages. This report explores the main consequences of the economic and social results of the price surge in Jordan. It addresses two economic approaches; the government's and the opposition's. The first supports the economic amendment program. It attributes the rise in prices to the fuel price hike. The government tried to curb the surge but failed because of the power of market forces. The opposition claimed that the price surge was caused by the government's economic policies. Notably, the economic amendment policies implemented since 1989. These policies modified the free market by allowing price subsidies in line with international banking policy. This issue is intensified by the fuel price hike. |
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After 1994 the Palestinian National Dialogue dealt with different issues. These included ending resistance and the Intifada, recognizing the Oslo Accords, agreeing on the settlement option, and recognizing Israel. In the years 2002 to 2004 the national dialogue entered a new stage, because it tried to unify the leading resistance factions and the Palestinian people, and attempted to calm Israel. In March 2006 the dialogue began a new stage which called for the rebuilding of the Palestinian homeland, and agreement on temporary and conditional peace with the occupier. After Hamas won control of the government in March 2006, conflict and fighting raged in Palestinian. As a result of this, the hope for national failed, as did the Mecca Agreement of February, 2007. When Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007 this aggravated the division. In a televised speech in June 2008, the Palestinian president, called for a Palestinian dialogue without stipulating any previous conditions. This followed the failure of the Fatah movement to uphold the Sana'a Declaration on the 23rd March, 2008. In November 2008, the Cairo Talks called for a Palestinian dialogue which raised many questions. Despite all efforts it did not have the elements necessary to succeed, especially after a year of the security situation in Gaza. The Palestinian factions have not taken a clear position on the bilateral dialogue with the head of Egyptian Intelligence Omar Suleiman. Also, there are still complicated issues like the current crisis and the difficulty of any agreement among competing factions. Sources of information indicate that in the absence of successful dialogue, Egypt will meet with the individual parties. Then it will present its proposals to the Arab League for them to be imposed on the Palestinian parties: then a mechanism for implementation must be worked out. This is the opinion of the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas who was disappointed by the Yemeni initiative. Some hoped that Egypt might achieve a conciliatory agreement, calling Hamas, Fatah, and other factions to sign it on the first of November 2008. Any party refusing to agree would be pressured by the Arab League. If there is the will to make the dialogue a success, the main challenge will be to achieve national unity against the occupier. Arab countries must not favor any Palestinian party. They must support the Palestinian national interest. There must be agreement on the mechanism for implementation of its terms on the ground. |
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Academics Evaluate the Professionalism of Al Jazera News Channel Over the last ten years Al Jazeera has won a reputation in the Arab world as a distinguished broadcaster. Evaluation of its professionalism was made by an Arab elite which specialized in the fields of media and political science. The Al Marefa Center for Public Opinion Surveys made a study about "views of professors of political science and the media in the Arab World regarding the professionalism of Al Jazeera News Channel". The survey was conducted over eleven months in 19 Arab countries with specialists and experts in this field. The participants were 46 researchers, supervisors, and assistants; 26 of them were professors. This project is the first of its kind in the Arab World; it is a significant project in the field of opinion surveys conducted by an Arab center with the participation of numerous professors. The results showed that the Al Jazeera Channel has a high level of professionalism in its objectivity and the level of its employee’s proficiency. The survey displayed a very favorable evaluation by Political and Media professors. In conclusion, the findings about the channel’s objectivity were ranged between a very high level and a relatively high level. Professionalism scored between excellent and very good. |
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This symposium comes in the wake of changes and challenges in the region that affect Jordan’s future and its regional role, either on the level of the peace process or changes in the political scene in Palestine, or the information leaks about the Substitute Homeland project which targets Jordan as an independent political entity. The symposium’s importance emerges in drafting the government’s and the Islamic Movement’s plan to build up future relations that achieve Jordan's goals of national unity and secure social and political sectors to protect it. With respect to trends in the relationship challenges, as perceived by the Islamic Movement, the participants emphasized that this relationship was historically characterized by coexistence, but it was unable to shift to an alliance or engage in the state’s administration and political decisions, and was sometimes marred by tension and mistrust. With regard to the variables affecting the restructuring of the relationship, the participants emphasized that conditions in Jordan and regional and international developments led to the kind of instantaneous transformation in the relationship with the Islamic Movement, but it was so far described as tactical. They emphasized that there is considerable disagreement in views. They also emphasized that the recent changes internationally, and in the region, forced the Jordanian decision-makers to re-evaluate the reality and draft it in order to preserve stability and ensure Jordan’s survival in the face of challenges. The symposium developed three possible scenarios. First: the success of the two parties to make a relationship that creates a qualitative shift in the internal political reconstruction of the Kingdom. Second: the trend towards partial understandings on a number of issues and the dismantling of outstanding conflicts. Third: the two sides fail to reach any agreement in whole or in part because of a conflict of interest, or because of interference from outside parties. |
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At present, the Palestinian Authority faces a sensitive crisis. It seeks to find a legal way to postpone the presidential election due to be held at the same date as the parliamentary election on 8th January, 2009. This is especially pressing following its failure to sign a national agreement to bring forward the parliamentary election to be held with the presidential election, according to constitutional election law. The Palestinian president's position has worsened. The return of political and legislative division, the existence of two governments in Gaza and the West Bank, and the failure to reach to a convincing political settlement, and Israeli obduracy which refused to implement the previous agreements. Consequently, the Palestinian president could not hold a presidential election in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is now under Hamas' control. The Palestinian president does not have the legal right to extend his term by even one day. If he does that he will face legal confusion; as did Salam Fayyad's government in Ramallah. It would weaken his negotiating position with Hamas and Israel. The legal chaos may lead to serious consequences. Experts, researchers and study centers need to make a significant effort to address this problem. They could play a key role in finding a solution for this crisis without more damage to the Palestinian cause and its people. Consequently, reinterpreting the constitution and Palestinian law is the first step to establish creative dialogue. This could protect democracy and unity in Palestine, and heal the disputes and political division between Fatah and Hamas. |
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Hamas and Jordan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges The symposium emphasized the strategic importance of the Palestinian Issue for Jordan, since this issue and its consequences have formed a major factor in the drafting the kingdom’s policy and its internal and external alliances. In addition to the close Jordanian link to the issue outcomes, whether or not those outcomes opposed Jordan’s interests or supported them. Current progress has madeJordanian decision-makers reassess the political reality in the region. The reassessment is the result of the changes in the International System or because of the increase in Hamas’ importance and strength and its political, ideological, social, and security power, or because of the reiteration of the other parties in the Palestinian scene before Hamas. These factors obliged the Jordanian decision-makers to reevaluate regional relations and its role in them. That is why Jordan called Hamas – which is the main party in the Palestinian scene, and which emerged from the Islamic Movement in Jordan – to a direct dialogue for the purpose of rearranging trelations between the two parties and to build new relations that are based on achieving co-strategic interests. The symposium has come out with five possible scenarios: First: forming a strategic relationship Second: to reach understandings and co-basis (مرحلية) Third: to build a relation that prevents misunderstandings Fourth: to agree only on the importance of such meetings and dialogues Fifth: to fail in achieving any progress in reaching interests and benefits to any of them, this means keeping the relation on its previous situation |
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